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(© Osprey Publishing. Extract taken from New Vanguard 93: Modern Israeli Tanks and Infantry Carriers 1985–2004) The Background SituationThe 1973 Yom Kippur War taught the Israel Defence Force (IDF) that its tanks and infantry carriers were vulnerable to man-portable anti-tank weapons. By the end of the war the wastelands of Sinai and the basalt - strewn fields of the Golan Heights were littered with the carcasses of damaged or destroyed Israeli armoured vehicles. The infantry weapons that wreaked such havoc carried high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) warheads. These warheads use shaped charges, consisting of a copper-lined cone pre-formed inside an explosive cylinder. When it hits a target, the HEAT round explodes, instantly squeezing the copper lining into a thin, high energy linear jet. The jet moves forward as fast as 8km/second, cutting through steel, destroying a target and killing its crew. The IDF learned from the Yom Kippur conflict. By the 1982 Lebanon war, it had equipped its tanks with bolt-on blocks of Blazer explosive reactive armour (ERA), specifically designed to defeat HEAT charges. Blazer utilises a thin layer of insensitive explosive material sandwiched at an oblique angle, within two steel plates. When initiated by the impact of a HEAT round, the explosive within a Blazer block detonates, blasting the metal plates of the ERA sandwich into the path of the round’s cutting jet as it begins to form. This disrupts the coherence of the jet, greatly reducing its destructive power before it reaches the tank’s main armour. In the 1982 war, Blazer was able to defeat the HEAT warheads then used in anti-tank missiles and some tank shells. Consequently Israeli tanks were well protected against infantry anti-tank weapons such as the rocket-propelled grenade (RPG). However, Blazer was only a partial solution. It could not defeat the kinetic energy (KE) rounds fired by tank cannon. These use dart-shaped penetrators made up of heavy metals such as tungsten or depleted uranium. The penetrators move at enormous velocity and can carve through tank armour even when supplemented with Blazer. In the 1982 conflict Israeli armoured personnel carriers (APCs), then mainly the M113 type, remained hopelessly at risk from light anti-tank weapons. First generation Blazer had two characteristics which made it unsuitable for infantry carriers. Firstly, it was too heavy. Secondly, when Blazer modules were detonated, there was considerable back-blast. The thin armored shell of a typical APC couldn’t withstand this without damage. Other than the overwhelming need to develop a survivable infantry carrier, several distinct but interrelated problems troubled the IDF’s Armoured Corps.
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Modern Israeli Tanks and Infantry Carriers 1985–2004
Author: Marsh Gelbart
Paperback; February 25 2004; 48 pages; ISBN: 1841765791
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